by Faizan Diwan:
Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf published his autobiography, In the Line of Fire, last September. As the title reflects, Musharraf has been in an unenviable position since 2001, caught between a demanding alliance with the United States and the increasingly frustrated Islamists at home. These Islamists include those who have had a long established presence in the military, a presence that is more and more threatening to both Musharraf ’s life and Pakistan’s stability, as some of these Islamists have become more aggressive in light of Musharraf ’s pro- U.S. stance in the war on terror. After all, it only takes one unhappy man in uniform with one well-timed explosive to bring an abrupt end to Musharraf ’s luck—and several have already tried.
Many soldiers have Islamist sympathies that lean too far to the right, because Pakistan has historically blurred the line between nationalism and Islamism in the military. As Shuja Nawaz states in his soon-to-be-published book Crossed Swords: Pakistan and its Army, the Pakistani military acquired a powerful religious orientation during the “Islamization” campaign in the late 1970s and 1980s, and soldiers learned to think of themselves as “soldiers of Islam” rather than of Pakistan. Despite supposed reversal of such reforms in the 1990s, legacies of this outlook survive today. The new military leaders may not be as steeped in religion, but they still share political views akin to the Islamists. Continued contact with the Taliban has also allowed even more extreme Islamist ideas to persist among the rank and file.
It is precisely such ideologies that have led some soldiers to become disenchanted with Musharraf ’s policies and to seek a more radical leader. There were two assassination attempts in 2003, and a group of officers refused to fight in 2004. Under the auspices of Musharraf, the conspirators were jailed or executed and the dissenters dismissed. The problem, though, is one of ideology—it goes beyond a few soldiers, and hence requires a solution that does, too. Successfully eradicating the threat of Islamism requires greater professionalism and discipline to curb religiosity in the military’s ranks. The leadership needs to restructure military training and ideologies with less focus on a religious identity and more on a national one. In essence, Pakistan needs a new, secular government to give it a new, secular army.
Musharraf is a threat to himself. His government does not provide the secularism needed to reform the military, despite his attempts to ally with the U.S. in its War on Terror. According to Husain Haqqani, associate professor of International Relations at Boston University and author of Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, “Musharraf is a semi-Islamist himself. Musharraf may not be a religious man, but he is not going to shutdown the Taliban or the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba anytime soon.” In fact, Musharraf continues to pander to religious parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, in return for their political support. His crackdown on domestic links to extremists has been glaringly lackluster, and he has even allowed certain madrassas, thought to breed the very terrorists he purports to fight, to remain active.
Restructuring the military along more secular lines can only occur once military rule has been replaced by democratic institutions. Unlike the military, these institutions will have public support that eliminates the need to develop connections with religious groups for power. As Haqqani told the Globalist, “It is good if the strength of the military dwindles, as then you can gradually implement change.”
This notion hinges on the proposition that the military’s power can be reduced in the first place, which appears unlikely with a military that has remained the most influential institution throughout the country’s history. However, in a country constantly debating the possibility of democratic rule, with increasing domestic pressure on the military to make such changes, it is not unrealistic to imagine a liberalization of political institutions. This would be even more attainable if the U.S. called for democracy, as democratization is necessary for both removing Islamists in the military and for success in the War on Terror.
To achieve the success it has been demanding from Musharraf, the U.S. simply needs to uphold its ideals of democracy, which it has been repeatedly criticized for betraying. For his own sake, his country’s sake, and the world’s sake, Musharraf needs to go.